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In Africa’s least developed countries (LDCs), escape from poverty and convergence to living 
standards of more advanced economies depends critically on structural transformation and the 
emergence of productive entrepreneurship that would accelerate growth and job creation. So far, 
however, subsistence agriculture has been the main source of employment in these countries, 
while a dynamic private sector in industry or high value-added services has remained elusive. 
Utilizing the flow approach to labor markets, this paper complements the empirical literature and 
numerous surveys on small and medium enterprise (SME) constraints and develops a theoretical 
framework that examines the main obstacles to entrepreneurship in Africa’s LDCs. The paper 
posits that given the persistent frictions in product and labor markets as well as skill shortages 
that characterize these economies, development of productive entrepreneurship cannot be left to 
markets alone. The policy analysis suggests that the state has an important role to play. Well-
targeted government interventions including training of potential entrepreneurs and workers can 
help establish more modern and highly productive SME clusters that Africa’s LDCs need.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
For a number of years now, policymakers and researchers have recognized entrepreneurship to 
be a key driver of economic development through fostering growth, job creation, technology 
adoption and innovation as well as poverty alleviation.2 At the same time, substantial differences 
across countries in the type of entrepreneurial activities have been also noted, including those in 
the shares of necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990; Acs, Dessai and 
Hessels, 2008). Specifically, opportunity entrepreneurs prevail in high-income countries while 
necessity ones dominate in low-income countries. The more educated entrepreneurs are with 
opportunity-based firms, while less educated ones are involved out of necessity (Acs et al, 2004). 
According to Acs and Varga (2005), the opportunity entrepreneurship has a significant positive 
effect on development, but the necessity one has almost none. 
 
More recently, experiences of transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, where a 
successful transition to market hinged on a dynamic private sector and especially new firms, 
have confirmed the importance of productive (opportunity) entrepreneurship for growth, job 
creation, competition and innovation. Benefits of productive entrepreneurship extend beyond 
economic wellbeing, especially when it is narrowly measured by GDP. Success stories of “self-
made” men and women across countries, sectors and cultures inspire hopes in others that in an 
enabling environment people from all backgrounds can improve their living standards through 
their own efforts, risk taking, and creativity.  
 
In Africa’s least developed countries (LDCs), the potential contribution of entrepreneurship to 
development has been widely discussed, with the debate going through several stages. 3 In this 
context, it needs to be emphasized that entrepreneurship as such has not been limited in Africa, 
but it is the lack of productive (opportunity) entrepreneurship that has been mostly missing 
(Rogerson, 2001). Moreover, as Gelb et al. (2007) point out, in many African countries a 
substantial productivity lag exists between small, often indigenous, firms and larger firms, which 
are frequently foreign-owned or owned by ethnic minorities. Despite these gaps, in the past many 
economists had argued that improving infrastructure and basic social indicators is the most 
pressing priority in Africa’s LDCs, putting the primary emphasis on the role of the state in 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Baliamoune-Lutz (2007). Since this paper aims to link entrepreneurship with development, it 
defines entrepreneurship as in Naudé (2010) to be “…the resource and process whereby individuals utilize 
opportunities in the market through the creation of new business firms.” Leff (1979) provides historical perspective 
on evolution of research on entrepreneurship and economic development.  
3 Africa’s 10 LDCs are Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Malawi, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo (Eritrea is omitted because of the lack of data). Despite their 
differences, these economies share features that hamper development of productive entrepreneurship, including (i) 
low literacy rates and large share of unskilled workers in manufacturing; (ii) weak business environment and 
application of the rule of law; and (iii) high share of subsistence agriculture in output and employment (Annex I). In 
contrast to advanced economies, Africa’s LDCs have much smaller shares of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in output and employment. SMEs account for about 30 and 17 percent of employment and output in low 
income countries, while they account for about 60 and 50 percent, respectively, in advanced economies 
(Commission on the Private Sector and Development, 2004). 
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development. In contrast, the role of the private sector predominated in the 1980s and 1990s, 
when the attention of policymakers turned to market-led development.4  
 
Over time, an increasing number of African policymakers and researchers have recognized that 
with the persistent weaknesses and market failures that characterize Africa’s LDCs, development 
of a productive private sector in these countries cannot be left to markets alone. This is because 
in Africa’s LDCs, successful entrepreneurship is often associated with mere survival rather than 
involvement in highly productive activities. Entering new activities involves substantial fixed 
costs and risks which may not be undertaken by private sector without extra incentives and 
support from the state. In such circumstances, without picking winners, well-targeted 
government interventions can ease the most biding constraints to productive entrepreneurship 
and thus facilitate private sector take-off (Bonaglia and Fukasaku, 2007). 
  
Given the importance of SMEs and productive entrepreneurship for development and the 
facilitating role that the state can play, it is crucial to identify the factors that most impede firm 
creation in Africa’s LDCs. At the same time it needs to be acknowledged that, as Naudé (2010) 
points out, the relationship between entrepreneurship and development is complex, and further 
research is needed on links between entrepreneurship, institutions, and development, especially 
in Africa.5 While credit constraints, business environment (including taxation) and infrastructure 
bottlenecks have dominated the discussion on obstacles facing new firms in Africa’s LDCs, skill 
shortages (both on the side of workers and entrepreneurs) have received less attention. Still, the 
evidence points to the lack of skills as an important additional constraint to starting new firms.6 
This paper formalizes the constraints persistent in Africa’s LDCs in an analytical framework, 
which is then used for an evaluation of policies. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, while Section 3 examines the 
impact of policies on productive entrepreneurship and skilled employment. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. The Model 
 
The model developed in this section aims at capturing various constraints faced by entrepreneurs 
in Africa’s LDCs with a focus on frictions in the business climate, the labor market and on 
                                                 
4 In recent years, policy makers in LDCs have paid increased attention to fostering private sector development as a 
key pillar of their national development strategies, which is also reflected in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(Bonaglia and Fukasaku, 2007). Examples of sectors where domestic private enterprises have contributed to poverty 
alleviation in low income countries include cut flowers in Kenya and leather product in Ethiopia. More generally, in 
low income countries, high economic growth is accompanied by a more than proportional growth in the share of the 
formal small and medium enterprise sector (Commission on the Private Sector and Development, 2004). 
5 For example, Balamoune-Lutz (2009) documents this complexity by showing that financial reforms have a positive 
effect on entrepreneurship and growth at early stages, but have a negative impact at high levels of reforms.  
6 According to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2009), the share of firms that identify the skill level of labor as a 
major constraint to their operations range from 5% in Liberia to 50% in Malawi, with an average of 20% for LDCs 
and well as for SSA. Labor market regulations and wage setting mechanisms constitute reportedly smaller constraint 
in these surveys– their impact is examined in detail in Davidson and Henrekson (2002).  
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shortages of skills.7 The model is an expanded version of Brixiova and Asaminew (2009), who in 
turn build on Snower (1996) and Gelb et al. (2009).  
The population is normalized to one and consists of infinitely-lived entrepreneurs and workers, 
with population sharesµ  and µ−1 , respectively. All agents are endowed with one unit of time 
every period, have risk neutral preferences in consumption of a single good, c, and cannot save, 
i.e. consume all their income each period. Firms are created through entrepreneurs’ search, at a 
flow cost γ2/)( 2xxd = , units of the consumption good per unit of time, where 0>γ denotes 
the efficiency of search. The entrepreneurs find a business opportunity according to a Poisson 
process with the arrival rate of x . 
The business opportunities that the entrepreneurs find have potential productivity per worker z . 
The consumption good can thus be produced either through self-employment in the informal 
sector, with low productivity per worker, b, or through firm in the formal sector with high 
productivity, z. In order to turn the business opportunities into firms, entrepreneurs need to find 
n  skilled workers who are in limited supply. Suppressing the time subscript t and denoting V  to 
be the aggregate number of skilled vacancies posted by entrepreneurs, N  the number of skilled 
workers searching for jobs, and h  the number of skilled-job matches, the matching function is 
described as:  
 
];min[ VNAh =   (1) 
 
where 01 >> A  is constant.8 According to (1), more skilled vacancies or more skilled searching 
workers lead to more matches. Entrepreneurs with high-productivity business opportunity thus 
find skilled workers with probability ]1,min[
V
NA=ρ .  
Entrepreneurs  
 
After finding both business opportunity and skilled labor, entrepreneurs produce output 
according to nzy ε= , where ,ε  10 << ε characterizes the quality of the business environment in 
which they operate. Firms earn after-tax profit: ))(1( nwnz −−= ετπ , where w  is the wage of 
skilled workers and τ  is the profit tax rate. Entrepreneurs who do not find business opportunity 
or skilled workers continue to search and work as self employed in the informal sector, earning 
income b.9 Firms are destroyed through firm-specific, idiosyncratic productivity shocks arriving 
at the exogenously given rate δ . 
 
                                                 
7 While credit constraints are important, they are covered elsewhere. Examples include Li (1998) for developed 
economies, Brixiova and Kiyotaki (1997) for transition economies, and AfDB and OECD (2005) for Africa. 
8 1<A  reflects the limited efficiency of matching, such as that  firms searching for skilled works are not fully 
aware of workers’ availability and vice versa. 
9 In this formulation, the model captures the fact that while entrepreneurship itself is abundant in Africa, successful 
entrepreneurs account for only a fraction of the total population of SMEs (Rogerson, 2001). 
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To characterize the optimization problems of entrepreneurs, the value function approach is 
utilized.10 Letting pJ and uJ  be the present discounted value of the income stream of an 
entrepreneur operating a highly productive private firm and of an entrepreneur searching for a 
business opportunity, respectively, the corresponding Bellman equations are: 
 
)( pup JJrJ −+= δπ    (2) 
 
[ ]⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+= )(
2
max
2
up
x
u JJxxbrJ ργ   (3) 
 
where r is the exogenously given discount rate. A searching entrepreneur receives the income 
from self-employment, b, finances cost of search of γ2/2x  and expects to open a firm at 
rate ρx . An entrepreneur running a firm receives profit and expects the firm to exit at rateδ . The 
utility- maximizing search intensity x , which equals the marginal cost of search with the 
expected benefit, is derived from differentiating equation (3) and is given by: 
 
)( up JJx −= γρ     (4) 
 
Hence the search intensity rises with the difference between the values of running a firm and 
searching, and thus with the level of productivity, z. It increases with the efficiency of search, γ , 
and the probability of finding skilled workers, ρ , which each entrepreneur takes as given.   
 
Workers 
  
Unskilled, self-employed workers in the informal sector acquire skills demanded in the highly 
productive private firms at exogenously given rate q , which costs them 0>φ units of 
consumption good. In turn, skilled workers then find employment in a high-productivity private 
firm with probability ]1,min[
N
VA=ξ . Skilled labor is homogeneous and all skilled jobs offer the 
same wage w. Workers who do not obtain skills or do not find skilled jobs continue to work in 
the informal sector as self-employed and earn constant income b, where wb <<0 . Skilled 
workers lose their jobs (and skills) at exogenous rateδ . 
 
Denoting pV and uV  to be the present discounted value of the income stream of a skilled 
worker employed in highly productive private firms and the present discounted value of being  
self-employed in an unskilled job in the informal sector, respectively, gives:  
 
)( pup VVwrV −+= δ   (5) 
 
                                                 
10 In the context of labor markets, this approach is also referred to as matching or flow approach to labor markets. 
This literature views job creation is as a stable function of the stock of searching workers and vacancies.  
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)( upu VVqbrV −+−= ξφ   (6) 
 
Equation (5) states that a skilled worker receives wage w and expects to go back to self-
employment at rateδ , while according to (6), an unskilled worker obtains income b from self-
employment, obtain skills at cost φ  and expects to find a skilled job at rate qξ , where q  is the 
rate of skill acquisition and ξ is the probability that skilled workers find skilled jobs.  
 
Wages 
 
Wages of skilled workers employed in the highly productive firms depend on conditions in the 
labor market for skilled workers according to:   
 
)()( ξδφ qrkbw +++−=    (7) 
 
where k is constant. Equation (7) shows that wages depend on the labor market conditions in the 
market for skilled labor, which are described by the exit rate from self-employment, ξq . It is 
derived from applying the efficiency wage consideration to (5) and (6). This consideration 
implies that firms choose wage so that the value of being employed exceeds value of being self-
employed by 0≥k . As (7) demonstrates, wages are positively related to informal sector income, 
b, discount rate, r, and exit rate from self-employment, ξq , but decline with cost of training, φ . 
 
Labor Market “Clearing” Conditions 
 
Let µ  be the total number of entrepreneurs. Denoting um as the share of entrepreneurs being 
self-employed and searching, while pm  as the share of entrepreneurs operating businesses, the 
labor market equilibrium for entrepreneurs satisfies: 
   
pu mm +=µ      (8) 
 
The evolution of number of entrepreneurs searching for business opportunities, um& , is given by 
the difference between inflows into the pool of searching entrepreneurs, )( um−µδ and the exits 
from it, umxρ . Moreover, from (8), up mm && −= .  
 
uuu mxmm ρµδ −−= )(&    (9) 
 
Similarly, denoting un as the number (share) of the unskilled workers (self-employed) in the 
informal sector and pn as the number of skilled workers employed in highly productive firms, the 
following labor market equilibrium condition for workers needs to hold: 
 
pu nn +=− µ1     (10) 
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The evolution of the share of workers working as self-employed in the informal sector can be 
described as follows:  
 
uuu nqnn ξµδ −−−= )1(&    (11) 
 
Where ξq is the rate of exit from self-employment while δ is the inflow rate into it. In the steady 
state the shares of searching entrepreneurs and workers in the informal sector are constant, i.e. 
0== uu mn && . Subsequently, these shares satisfy:  
ρδ
δµ
x
mu +=         (12) 
 
ξδ
µδ
q
nu +
−= )1(     (13)   
 
According to (12), the steady state number of self-employed entrepreneurs who are searching for 
business opportunities, um , decreases with the exit rate from self-employment, ρx , as well as 
with the quality of the job-worker match, i.e. lower separation rate δ . At the same time, it 
increases with the higher share of potential entrepreneurs,µ . Similarly, (13) shows that the 
steady state equilibrium number of workers who are self-employed in the informal sector and 
acquiring skills, un , decreases the exit rate from self-employment, qξ , and the quality of the 
match/lower separation rateδ .   
 
The equilibrium in this economy is then characterized by entrepreneurs’ effort, by allocations of 
workers and entrepreneurs, and by the wage rate such that: (i) entrepreneurs choose optimal 
search effort for business opportunities (x);  (ii) wages satisfy (7); (iii) product market clears, and 
(v) labor market conditions (8), (10), (12) and (13) are met. 
 
To characterize the equilibrium, entrepreneurs’ probabilities of finding skilled workers and 
skilled workers’ probabilities of finding skilled jobs need to be specified. Denoting the ratio of 
skilled vacancies in the private sector to skilled workers searching for jobs asθ , i.e. 
qn
nxm
u
u=θ , 
where nxmV u= and qnN u= , three  cases can be considered: (i) shortages of firms with skilled 
vacancies, i.e. 1<θ ; (ii) shortages of skilled workers, i.e. 1>θ ; and (iii) no shortages, i.e. 
1=θ .11 The probability ρ  that during an interval t∆ an entrepreneur finds skilled workers and 
the probability ξ  that skilled workers find skilled jobs thus become:  
 
⎩⎨
⎧
>
≤= − 1
1
1 θθ
θρ
whenA
whenA
   (14) 
                                                 
11 When 1=θ , the number of skilled vacancies equals the number of skilled workers searching from jobs. In this 
case, the exit rates of entrepreneurs and workers from self-employment are both A. In what follows, we focus on one 
of the cases with shortages, i.e. shortage of skilled vacancies, 1<θ , or shortages of skilled workers, 1>θ . 
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⎩⎨
⎧
<
≥=
1
1
θθ
θξ
whenA
whenA
     (15) 
 
Conditions (14) and (15) show the interdependence of outcomes of entrepreneurs and workers: If 
entrepreneurs increase their search effort from a situation of 1<θ (shortage of skilled vacancies), 
probability that skilled workers find skilled jobs rises. If entrepreneurs increase their effort to the 
point where 1>θ , probability that workers find jobs rises to A, but probability that entrepreneurs 
find skilled workers falls. However, when making decisions about their search intensity, 
individual entrepreneurs take θ  as given and disregard these external effects, which results in 
inefficient equilibrium outcomes. Below, we examine the cases where either skilled job openings 
are scarce or skilled workers are scarce. More emphasis is put on the case with shortages of 
skilled jobs, which describes the situation prevailing in most Africa’s LDCs.  
 
3.  Policy Analysis 
 
The economy laid out in the preceding section exhibits two main types of frictions (rigidities) 
where government interventions may be warranted: (i) in the labor market ( 1<A ) and (ii) in the 
business climate ( 1<ε ). Some of the countries are likely to face very high costs of setting up 
business, which in the model would be captured by low efficiency of the entrepreneurs’ search 
cost, γ  or very high profit taxation, τ . Moreover, due to imperfect information in the skilled 
workers’ labor market, the quality of match may be low and hence the separation rate, δ , high, 
with skilled workers failing to find the available jobs (low A). In economies where skill shortages 
are so severe that they inhibit firm creation (low q  or highφ ), government support to training of 
workers could be warranted. Policies below, which aim at overcoming these bottlenecks, can be 
grouped into several categories according to the channels of transmission (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Policy instruments to support productive entrepreneurship  
Stimulating search of 
entrepreneurs (by raising 
expected net profit) 
Improving availability of 
skilled workers (through 
training) 
Improving matching process 
(by facilitating mobility and 
information exchange) 
Improving business 
environment  
(increasing ε ) 
 
Co-financing higher 
education  
(reducing φ ) 
Supporting entrepreneurs’ 
search through training 
(increasing γ ) 
Reducing SME taxation 
(lowering τ ) 
Co-financing adult training 
(reducing φ ) 
Improving information at the 
skilled labor market  
(increasing A) 
Reducing start up cost 
(increasing γ ) 
Improving information on 
types of available skilled jobs 
(reducing δ ) 
Removing barriers to mobility 
through language training, 
housing (increasing A) 
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In what follows, we examine two cases: (i) when skilled jobs openings are scarce and (ii) when 
skilled workers are scarce.12  
 
I. The shortage of skilled job openings ( 1<θ ) 
 
Under this scenario, A=ρ and θξ A= , that is entrepreneurs with skilled vacancies are more likely to 
fill them than skilled workers to find skilled openings  As specified in (4), entrepreneurs choose their 
search intensity, x, so that the marginal cost of search equals to the expected marginal payoff. Denoting 
up JJd −=  to be the difference between the value of running a highly productive firm (with skilled 
workers) and being self-employed, this implies that Adx γ= . The equilibrium is then characterized by 3 
equations in 3 unknowns – entrepreneurs’ search effort, probability that skilled workers find skilled jobs 
and private sector wages ( wx ,,ξ ):  
 
]))(1[(
2
)(
2
bnwnzAxArx −−−=++ ετγδ     (16) 
 
qAxnq
xnA
)1()1( µµδµ
µδξ −−+−=      (17) 
 
and the wage equation (7). Equilibrium wage and entrepreneurs’ search occur where (16) and (7) 
intersect, with ζ determined by (17). Exogenous shifts in any of the three equations affect both 
the probability that skilled workers can find jobs, ξ  (and their wages, w ) and the intensity of 
entrepreneurs’ search, x  (Table 2). Often, such shifts are caused by changes in policies or 
institutions. For example, improvements in the business environment,ε , increase the 
entrepreneurs’ search, x. This in turn raises the probability that searching skilled workers find 
skilled jobs ξ  as well as their wage, w. Same holds about improvements in the efficiency of the 
entrepreneurs’ search,γ . Assuming that )1/(1 n+≤µ , i.e. the population of potential 
entrepreneurs is limited, the comparative statics are as in Table 2. 
 
The results show that the steady state share of self-employed entrepreneurs searching for 
business opportunities in the formal sector is negatively related to improvements in the business 
climate, ε , the efficiency of search, γ , and the reduction in the profit tax rate, τ . Moreover, in 
this case measures aimed at easing constraints on the firm side (improvements to the business 
environment, lowering of profit tax and improving conditions for entrepreneurs search) have 
unambiguously positive impact on skilled workers’ chances of finding skilled jobs and the wage 
they receive as well as on entrepreneurs’ search and start ups. While the improvement of the 
matching process (A) impact positively skilled workers’ probability of finding skilled jobs, it also 
raises wages. As firms’ profitability declines, the impact on the entrepreneurs’ search and hence 
the number of private firms is unclear. Similar observation applies to the quality of match as 
reflected in reducing the separation rate,δ .  
                                                 
12 The case with no shortages, i.e. NV =⇔= 1θ , is not explicitly covered. However, its solution would be 
straightforward, with .A== ξρ   Policies favorable to entrepreneurship vary with different levels of GDP per 
capita, with skill shortages being more prominent in more developed economies (Acs et al., 2008). 
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Table 2. Comparative statics under shortages of skilled vacancies 1/ 
On the equilibrium value of   
 
 
 
 
Effects of an increase in 
Skilled workers’ 
probability of finding 
skilled jobs 
 
ξ  
The share of 
entrepreneurs 
searching for 
opportunities  
um  
Quality of the business environment, ε  + - 
Efficiency of entr. search, γ  + - 
Profit tax rate, τ  - + 
Efficiency of matching, A + ? 
Separation rate, δ  - ? 
Rate of skill acquisition, q  - no impact 2/ 
Source: Author’s calculations. 1/ ? denotes ambiguous impact. 2/ Improving rate of skill acquisition (or reducing 
cost of training would not have any impact on the number of searching entrepreneurs as long as the binding 
constraint would remain on the side of skilled vacancies.  
 
As Table 2 shows, government policies need to address the binding constraints in order to 
stimulate private firm creation. For example, when skilled workers are abundant, government 
policies aimed at training and skill acquisition would be ineffective in supporting 
entrepreneurship.13 Further expenditures in these areas would only raise the share of skilled 
workers searching for jobs. However, this could lower workers’ probability of finding skilled 
jobs, leading to a larger pool of educated workers in the informal sector. In this case the binding 
constraints to be addressed are on the side of job creation, in particular the business environment, 
taxation and start up costs. 
 
II. The shortage of skilled workers ( 1>θ ) 
 
Under this scenario, A=ξ and 1−= θρ A , that is skilled workers have higher changes of finding skilled 
jobs than entrepreneurs with skilled vacancies would find suitable workers. The equilibrium is again 
characterized by 3 equations in 3 unknowns ( wx ,,ρ ). In addition to entrepreneurs’ search effort, x, and 
skilled workers’ wage rate, w, probability that entrepreneurs with skilled vacancies find skilled 
workers, ρ , now needs to be determined: 
 
]))(1[(
2
)(
2
bnwnzxrx −−−=++ ετγρρδ       (18) 
 
nxAqnn
qA
])1([
)1(
µµµδ
µδρ −−−
−=    (19) 
 
                                                 
13 Any increase in the rate of skill acquisition is completely offset by the lower probability of workers finding a job.  
11 
 
Wage is again determined through the wage equation (7). Equilibrium wage, w, and 
entrepreneurs’ search, x, occur where (18) and (7) intersect, with probability of finding skilled 
workers, ρ , determined by (19). The comparative statics are:  
 
Table 3. Comparative statics under shortages of skilled workers  
On the equilibrium value of Effects of an increase in ρ  
un  
Business environment, ε  - no impact 
Efficiency of entr. search, γ  - no impact 
Profit tax rate, τ  + no impact 
Efficiency of matching, A + - 
Separation rate δ  + + 
Rate of skill acquisition, q  + - 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
 
Self-employment of workers in the informal sector is negatively related to the improved 
efficiency of matching, A, and to the increased rate of skill acquisition, q . In Table 3, it is 
particularly worth noting that with the relative abundance of firms searching for skilled workers, 
government policies aiming at improvements of the business environment and other bottlenecks 
on the side of firm creation alone would not generate highly productive (skilled) jobs. Increased 
government expenditures on training that would raise the rate of skill acquisition would be more 
effective.14   
  
Simulations 
 
To further illustrate how changes in policies and institutions can impact labor market outcomes, 
simulations are preformed, using equations (3) and (16) – (20). The benchmark equilibrium is 
Case I above (with shortages of private firms with skilled vacancies). This is because in most 
Africa’s least developed countries the more binding constraint seems to be the lack of private 
firms with “good” jobs (highly productive and well-paid jobs), the absolute low skill level 
prevalent in these countries notwithstanding. Experiences of more developed countries indicate 
that with rapid private sector growth and increased complexity of production, skill shortages 
could start impeding private firm creation and eventually become the binding constraint.  
 
Simulations for Case I have been performed with the baseline parameters as detailed in Table 4.15 
    
 
 
                                                 
14 Policies encouraging training would be effective as long as they would not lead to excessively high wages and 
thus discourage firm creation to the point that firms with skilled vacancies would become scarce. 
 
15 To the extent possible parameters reflect labor market in these countries. For example, the 50% share of the 
informal sector is its share in Ethiopia, and so does the 30% gap between the formal and informal sector wages.  
However, the data is not adequate to conduct a full-fledged calibration exercise.  
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Table 4. Baseline parameters 
Parameter A µ  k δ  γ  q  ε  z  φ  n  r  b τ  
Value 0.5 0.3 1 0.2 1 1 0.45 2 0.3 3 0.1 0.385 0.3 
 
With these parameters, steady state values of the key variables of the model (self-employment, 
private sector entrepreneurs, workers in the formal sector, wages and probability of skilled 
workers finding skilled jobs) become as detailed in Table 5.   
 
Table 5. Steady state values under the baseline parameters (shortage of skilled vacancies) 
Self-employment (% of LF) 1/ 50.1 
Entrepreneurs operating high-prod. Firms (% of LF) 12.5 
Workers employed in high prod. firms (% of LF) 37.5 
Skilled wages (units of cons. good) 0.62 
Probability that skilled worker finds skilled job 0.23 
Entrepreneur’s search effort (unit of cons. good) 0.29 
1/ Includes both workers and potential entrepreneurs searching for business opportunities. 
 
The elasticity of self-employed workers, searching entrepreneurs, skilled wages and probability 
that skilled workers find skilled jobs to changes in each of the policy variables A,,,, δτγε  may 
be calculated by changing values of these variables by 20 percent and computing the new 
equilibrium values. The impact of changing the rate of skill acquisition (due to government 
support to co-financing training cost) is also considered (Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Elasticities of key macroeconomic variables to changes in policies  
Policy 
variable  
New 
value  
Self-
empl. 
 
Share of 
entrepr. 
in LF 
Skilled 
wages 
Entr. 
search 
Probability 
finding 
skilled job 
Elasticity of self-
empl. to 20 % 
change in variable 
  .  Units of cons  % change 
ε  0.54 40.3 15.0 0.75 0.40 0.36 -19.6 
τ  0.36 51.9 12.0 0.60 0.27 0.21 3.6 γ  1.20 48.8 12.8 063 0.30 0.24 -2.6 
δ  0.24 58.3 10.4 0.62 0.26 0.19 16.4 
A 0.60 47.7 13.1 0.64 0.26 0.26 -4.8 
q  1.20 50.1 12.5 0.62 0.29 0.19 0 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The results presented in Table 6 are consistent with those in Table 2 in previous section (Case I – 
shortages of private firms with skilled vacancies). They illustrate that improvements in the 
business climate (higherε ) and reduction in start up costs (higherγ ) would reduce self-
employment in the informal sector and raise the number of highly-productive firms and skilled 
employment in the formal sector. The increase in tax rates τ  would have an opposite effect. 
Productive entrepreneurship and skilled employment can be also encouraged through increased 
information availability and thus improved efficiency as well as the quality of the matching 
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process (higher A and lowerδ ). Finally, reducing cost of entrepreneurial search, including 
through training of entrepreneurs (higherγ ), would yield positive outcomes.16 
 
Among the various policy measures examined, by raising productivity improvements in the 
business environment can be expected to have particularly high effect on reducing self-
employment and creating skilled jobs. Investment in physical capital (including in infrastructure) 
and institutional reforms that enhance productivity would have similar impact.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
Which government interventions can foster the emergence of productive entrepreneurship in 
Africa’s LDCs? The answer to this question matters, as absence of such entrepreneurship in 
these countries has hampered their productivity, creation of skilled jobs, innovation, and poverty 
reduction. To shed some light on these issues, this paper has developed a theoretical framework 
of obstacles to productive entrepreneurship in the formal sector of Africa’s LDCs, modeling 
constraints both on the side of entrepreneurs and workers. While an abundant descriptive, survey 
and empirical literature on the topic of entrepreneurship and development in low income 
countries exists, theoretical studies have so far been rare.17 This paper contributes to closing this 
gap with a model that captures some of the main constraints faced by entrepreneurs in Africa’s 
LDCs, including their own skill shortages and those of potential workers.  
 
The model developed in this paper reflects also several key stylized facts of the African labor 
markets, including the abundance of the necessity and the scarcity of the opportunity 
entrepreneurship. The policy analysis shows that government interventions may help stimulate 
private sector take-off. However, given the scarcity of budgetary resources and the numerous 
constraints, policy actions need to be well-targeted and address the most pressing ones to be 
effective. In an economy characterized by the scarcity of skilled job openings, policymakers 
should aim at removing obstacles to firm creation such as poor business climate, high taxation of 
excessive start up costs. In turn, where skilled workers are scarce, training policies may be most 
effective. Since in a dynamic economy the binding constraints to productive entrepreneurship 
constantly evolve, the importance of policy selectivity and sequencing cannot be overstated. 
 
In addition to policies intended to overcome constraints to firm entry and skill bottlenecks, other 
active labor market policies, especially information exchange between available jobs and 
searching workers, could play a positive role. Specifically, with better information, the efficiency 
of the matching process between skilled openings and workers would rise while search time 
would decrease. The quality of jobs matches and job duration would also improve. Finally, 
future research could examine policies to mitigate credit constraints in the post-crisis world, as 
these constraints became even more binding due to the global financial crisis and the increased 
cost of credit that it brought about for Africa’s SMEs.  
                                                 
16 Training could be on, for example, writing business proposals, setting up businesses, and networking. See, for 
example, World Economic Forum (2009) and Martinez et al. (2010).  
17 Gelb et al. (2009) is an exception as the authors develop a simple model of entrepreneurship in Southern and 
Eastern Africa and their decisions regarding formalization.  
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Annex I – Africa’s 10 Least Developed Countries: The Facts 
 
The disproportionate share of agriculture in GDP, low GDP growth and low literacy rates 
characterize Africa’s LDCs… 
 
Table 1. Africa’s LDCs: Selected Indicators 
  
GDP per 
capita, US$, 
2000 prices) 
Share of 
agriculture 
in value 
added in 
2007 (%) 
Average 
annual real 
GDP 
growth, 
2005‐08 
(%) 
Adult literacy rates 
(% of population 
aged 15 and above, 
1999‐2007) 
Burundi  113  32  2.4  59 
Central African Rep.  223  53  1.9  49 
Congo Dem. Rep.  101  40  3.6  67 
Ethiopia  180  43  6.8  36 
Guinea Bissau  141  61  1.4  65 
Liberia  134  66  3.7  56 
Malawi  182  30  3.8  72 
Niger  190  41  4.4  29 
Sierra Leone  247  42  10.3  38 
Togo   222  43  1.3  53 
sub‐Saharan Africa  684  15  5.8  62 
LDCs (UN classification)  375  25  …  … 
Sources: African Economic Outlook database, World Bank Development Indicators database, and United Nations 
Human Development Report database.  
 
The business environment and the rule of law are also weaker than in other African countries … 
 
Figure 1. Rule of law and GDP per capita: Africa’s LDCs and other countries, 2008 1/ 
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Source: World Bank Governance database. 1/ Excludes Eritrea and Zimbabwe.  
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Africa suffers from the human capital gap…  
 
Figure 2a. Education index (2009) and GDP per capita (2008) 1/  
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Source: World Bank Knowledge Economy database. 1/ EMEs and developing countries in KAM database.  
 
 
…and skill shortages in Africa’s LDC seem particularly pronounced… 
 
 
Figure 2b. Unskilled workers in manufacturing firms in Africa’s LDCs, 2006  
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey database.  
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